Development of Nursing Skills in Oral Care Placement

Development of Nursing Skills in Oral Care Placement INTRODUCTION This essay is going to focus on the nursing skills that I developed during a period of placement simulations and in the community, placing emphasis on oral care, communication and bed bath. It will outline the fundamental aspects of clinical nursing skills that I have begun to acquire. This will also highlight the learning processes which took place and how it helped me to enhance my knowledge, and ethical values in order to deliver quality and safety of care. Using other sources of current literature, I will use a reflective model to discuss how I have achieved the necessary level of learning outcome. By utilising this model I hope to demonstrate my knowledge and understanding in relation to these skills as well as identifying areas with scope for learning. Reflection is the process of reviewing an experience in order to describe, analyse, evaluate and so inform learning about practice (Reid 1993). There are many reflective models that I could have used, including Johns (2004), Driscoll (2000), Atkins and Murphy (1994), Kolbs (1984), and Gibbs (1988). However, Gibbs (1988) model of reflection was selected, as a framework, because it focuses on different aspects of an experience and allows the learner to revisit the event fully. By contemplating it thus, I am able to appreciate it and guided to where future development work is required. Skill 1: Oral Care Description I was part of a placement simulation group which went to the multi-skills laboratory to practice delivering and receiving oral hygiene. I was assigned a colleague to brush his teeth using a toothbrush and paste. I put on gloves to prevent contamination (NICE 2003). Seeking his consent, I undertook a briefÂÂ  visual assessment ofÂÂ  his mouths health. I then put him in a comfortable position so that he could tolerate the wash. Thereafter, I cleaned all-round the mouth, gums and tongue. I finished off by helping him to rinse his mouth with mouthwash. I treatedÂÂ  my partner as though he was physically unable to hold the brush himselfÂÂ  to scrub his own teeth, but he was able to communicate with me and was able to assist me in terms of spitting and gargling with water at the end of the procedure. Feelings When first informed that I was expected to undertake this task I felt anxious and concerned. I was aware that I had not brushed anyones teeth outside of my family before and that the mouth is an intimate and personal part of the body which is not usually exposed to anyone other than me or the dentist. I was concerned about how my partner (whom I did not know well at that stage) would react to me examining his mouth. Writers have described such intimate physical assessments as creating a potentially intrusive situation (Lewis 2006, Sturdy 2007) which might cause the patient to feel uncertain and inadequate. I was also concerned that my own anxiety was shared by my partner who also appeared embarrassed and awkward at the time. This anxiety was increased when during the procedure my partner began to cough as though distressed. This caused me to feel hesitant about continuing- a situation recognised by Millon (1994) as a common response for carers to such an experience, although I persevered with his cooperation. When the task was completed I felt comfortable with my performance overall. Evaluation What was good about the experience was that, despite being aware that this role is often delegated to health care assistants (Kelly et al 2010), I was able to deliver a fundamental component of essential nursing care (Essence of Care 2003) quite effectively. The experience helped me to appreciate that oral care provides any nurse with an ideal opportunity to undertake a thorough physical, emotional and cognitive assessment of a patient (DOH, 2001). I was satisfied delivering this aspect of care without harming the patient as no injuries were sustained (having I checked his mouth prior to and after cleansing). Also, I was pleased to have an opportunity to improve my communication skills through the delivery of this skill and to understand the impact that this might have on the development of a therapeutic relationship with future patients. From my colleagues reaction and feedback, I understood how feedback is an important learning tool. Despite my discomfort during the undertaking of this task, the experience highlighted the potentially complex problems I might have to solve in the provision of care needs to patients for whom I may not have had contact with before. Analysis Administration of this clinical skill involved undertaking an assessment of my colleagues mouth before delivering any care in order to help determine the most appropriate means of delivering oral care. Malkin (2009) asserts that this is a critical component of the procedure and was one I was keen not to overlook. The World Health Organisation (WHO 2010) describes a healthy mouth as being free of chronic mouth and facial pain and in the situation described; this is the condition I found my partners mouth to be in. I was therefore happy to proceed with cleaning his teeth as instructed. I selected to use a soft bristled toothbrush and toothpaste. The use of these adjuncts are described by many writers as being the most appropriate in terms of removing plaque and preventing trauma to the gums (Holman et al 2005,McCauliffe 2007).Despite this it has been identified that they are also most often not selected by nurses who appear uncertain about most effective evidence based practice ( McAul iffe 2007). Conclusion Clearly, mouth care is important and that, nurses have a role in assessing and maintaining it (Malkin, 2009).The task identified the role of the nurse in providing encouragement to the patient whilst delivering oral care. His weakness created a sense of dependency upon me and necessitated the utilisation of good communications skills on my part to complete the task properly. It has raised my awareness the effects of nursing interventions on others within my practice. Action Plan At the moment, I read more books a day than practice. My aim is to be proactive in the future by promptly opening up through total participation and doing more practices by brushing my teeth on regular basis. I would consider brushing others also and allowing them to brush mine in order to become familiar with areas that are often not well attended to. Keeping up to date with evidence based principles of practice will be maintained through the scrutiny of journals that refer to this aspect of care. I will take care to remember my feelings when providing and receiving oral hygiene before delivering it to patients in the future. Recognising the potential for embarrassment and awkwardness I will ensure that I treat the patient with sensitivity and discretion at all times. Skill 2: Communication Skills Description I accompanied my mentor to attend to a consultation with R, in persuading him as a non-compliant patient, in taking his medication. He had refused to communicate with anyone, and had been violent and very suspicious of nursing interventions in the past. He would not open his door and started shouting. When he appeared quiet he let us in. I thought it would be nice for him to have some interaction after seeking his consent. I pulled up a chair next to my client so that I was closer to him and was at a similar eye level. I engaged him in a conversation about football. When I mentioned Arsenal, he became interested in the conversation. I realised he was a fan of the club and told me more about the club. I listened attentively, nodding and contributing. I ceased this as an opportunity to explain the need for taking medication and side effects of non-compliance. He understood and pledged to take his medication daily. He took some to our surprise. Feelings Throughout the whole experience I felt terribly nervous as I knew I was being judged on how well I could achieve the skill. My initial perception was that R was a difficult patient and considered withdrawing but I felt emotionally concerned about meeting a professional obligation. I understood that I owed him a duty of care (NMC, 2008) and simply withdrawing was not professional in my view. Evaluation I was pleased to have an opportunity to improve my communication skills through which, I was able to convince him in taking his medication without confrontation. It was good that I sat in the chair next to him and did not just stand over him to show I valued him and that I was not in a hurry. I used good body language and facial expressions as stated by Egan (2002). I understood the impact that this skill might have on the development of a therapeutic relationship with future patients. Ironbar et al (2003) stresses that, therapeutic relationships can be stressful. This requires insight, self-awareness and ability to cope effectively with stress. The downside was that the patient initially felt that I was being nasty as I was persistent in having him take the medicine. Also, I found it difficult to communicate with the patient initially because I did not understand his condition. Barker (2003) reports of how in recent times empathy has been shown to enable nurses to investigate and un derstand the experience of persons experiencing a state of chaos as a consequence of psychiatric order. Analysis There are many reasons why somebody may refuse to communicate. Wilkinson (1992) cited in (Kluijver et al, 2000) defined communication as an open two-way communication in which patients are informed about the nature of their disease and treatment and are encouraged to express their anxieties and emotions. Sheldon, (2009) expands this further by saying in nursing; communication is a sharing of health-related information between a patient and a nurse, with both participants as sources and receivers. The nature of health care demands expertise in interviewing, explaining, giving instructions and advising (Williams, 1997). In this instance, this was exactly what I did. The use of therapeutic communications in nursing, particularly empathy, is what enables therapeutic change and should not be underestimated (Norman and Ryrie, 2004). Egan (2002) argues that empathy is not just the ability to enter into and understand the world of another person but also be able to communicate this understan ding to him. Nurses should be aware that patients, who are paranoid and suspicious of staff interventions as was the case of patient R, might not readily accept support from staff. OCarroll et al (2007) contended that in our professional roles, nurses do not have the same option as we do in our personal life by withdrawing from difficult relationships. I began to feel tearful, but then quickly reminded myself that there must be a reasonable explanation for him refusing to communicate or cooperate with everyone. I felt my client needed a choice and giving him a choice will give him back some of his independence when he could be feeling helpless and vulnerable; and his self-esteem could be decreased (Child Higham, 2005) as his cooperation could be inhibited. The need to build therapeutic relationship with the patient is paramount in gaining trust and respect (Rigby and Alexander, 2008). McCabe (2004) argues that the use of effective interpersonal skills, a basic component of nursing, must be patient centred. If I had been tense and negative, my client would not have enjoyed the conversation and would have felt uncomfortable and rushed (Kozier, et al 2008). Conclusion Communication is without doubt the medium through which the nurse-patient relationship takes place. The skills of active listening and reflection promote better communication and encourage empathy building. Caring for acutely mentally unwell patients requires of the nurse sensitivity, conveying warmth and empathy. Engaging meaningfully and actively listening to patients makes them perceive the practice as valuing rather than punishing, therapeutic rather than custodial. Communicating with patients is in itself nursing and therefore should be encouraged at all levels of nursing care. I feel my caring skill went well, because we were both relaxed and comfortable. As no problems occurred, I would do most things the same again. Action plan My goal for the future is to develop my knowledge by reading about long term conditions like schizophrenia so as to give me insight into those conditions before administering care. If patients appear distressed, I would get other members of staff to help give reassurance to them. I will also use reflective discussions with mentors and peer groups about managing similar situations. Finally, I will be taking the initiative and not being timid about challenging situations- the more times I meet the challenge, the better equipped I become at learning to manage them. Skill 3: Bed Bath Description I was asked with a colleague to bath a dummy patient during a placement simulation. The procedure was outlined by the lecturer present. I prepared the trolley with soap, bowl of warm water, soap and towel.I explained why I was going to give him a bath and gained consent. I drew the curtains to maintain patients privacy and dignity at all times. I washed my hands, put on apron and gloves to prevent infection and contamination and bathed him all round (front, back and sides including crevasses and folds) using separate towel for the private area. I covered the patient with the bath blanket to prevent chilling for his comfort. Whilst carrying out the bed bath I assessed his skin condition for any sores or broken skin.I treated the patient as if confined to bed or he is too unwell to attend to his own hygiene needs but able to communicate with me and reassured him everything was alright. Feelings Before starting, I had many emotions running through me. I expressed that I did not have much confidence in performing the task. This was because I: (1) lacked experience, (2) was concerned that I would not perform to the patients expectations and (3) was still trying to adjust to the laboratory environment. I therefore felt embarrassed that my lack of confidence was so obvious to present lecturer and colleagues. I later felt calm but a little apprehensive due to this. Despite all these, I persevered and finished the task successfully. Evaluation What was good of this experience was that, I upheld the reputation of the profession by maintaining it (NMC, 2008) as I did not speak over the client nor did I ignore him at any point during the procedure The instructions about what I needed to do was clear and I understood it and this give him the utmost respect, comfort and safety. By washing my hands thoroughly before coming into contact with the patient, Pirie (2010) explains that micro-organisms are easily removed through the process of hand washing. With supervision and comments from the lecturer present, I completed the task without harming the patient. Thomas et al, (1997), explains that, supervision is an important development tool for all learners. What was not good about this experience was when I redressed the client without allowing the client to choose the dress which I will prevent happening again. Nurses are taught to include family members where possible, keeping them well informed constantly about the condition and health care which is taking place. This helps make families feel more comfortable and also enables them to gain a clear picture of what is going on. Again, the lecturer was concerned that I appeared to lack confidence, and explained that, being able to express opinions clearly and confidently was essential in my future career as a nurse. In the lecturers view, the only way to develop confidence was to participate regularly which Bulman Schutz (2008) confirms. Analysis Skin care is a fundamental aspect of basic nursing care, with the outcome of these interventions often used to gauge the quality of the care provided (Voegelli, 2010). . Bathing involves actions to keep the skin clean and is essential for healthy skin (Dougherty Lister 2008). There are essentially two bed bath options available for todays health professional. Option one is the traditional soap and water bed bath which is labour intensive. Option two is the use of pre-packaged specialist bed bath wipes that come already impregnated with skin-friendly cleansers and moisturizers (Massa, 2010). Bathing is an intimate activity which requires physical assessment. Writers have described such intimate physical assessments as creating a potentially intrusive situation (Lewis 2006, Sturdy 2007) which might cause the patient to feel uncertain and inadequate. I was prepared not to overlook this area. The use of curtains and screens helped maintain the persons dignity and self-esteem (Child Higham, 2005). Despite this, dignity is seldom defined and there are few guidelines that nurses may use in their practice to safeguard individual patients dignity (Dignity in care (DOH 2006).It is true that healthcare assistants and auxiliaries can perform bed bathing and attend to patients hygiene needs; there are also important roles for the registered nurse, as it is often during the bathing of a patient that the nurse/patient relationship develops (Downey et al, 2008). In addition, the observation of a patient during the process of bathing provides excellent opportunities to make more detailed assessment and observation of the patients condition and progress (Pegram et al 2007). Conclusion Without doubt, provision of bed bath clients is to promote personal hygiene and to give them a sense of well-being and allows the caregivers to monitor changes in the clients skin condition (Evans, 2001). My reflective experience was very basic although a lot of the experience was preparation, planning and assessing which prevented the experience from going badly in anyway. I will also ask if they want to brush their teeth so that they feel more comfortable and also help prevent dental decay or any sores from developing around the gums. I now feel confident and comfortable enough to assist bathing people. Action plan If a situation like this was to arise again I think I would like to try to take out more time to talk to the client about how they are feeling and involve him at every stage of the activity. I also feel that it is important for me to work alongside more experienced members of staff to be able to learn more whilst on my placements. I think it is worth highlighting that as this procedure was carried out on a manikin, it did not reflect proper nurse / patient interaction and that I will now need to try and develop this skill and what I have learned from it to the wider clinical context when assisting patients who really do need help meeting their hygiene needs. I have learned something about giving the patients choice but it really wont be until I apply this skill into practice that I will receive feedback about how effective Ive undertaken the task, from the person that really matters or is in the best place to help me evaluate my actions, that person being the patient. CONCLUSION Administering oral hygiene, bed bathing and how these are combined with care, compassion and communication forms the basis of a holistic approach to care, and with the knowledge I got from supporting literature formed the foundation of my learning and practice. This experience has undoubtedly enhanced my critical thinking as a nurse and prepared me to move forward in my development and practice as a caring and competent nurse. I see myself as being in the right job which offers many opportunities for development and to improve upon my knowledge and skills. I have clearly demonstrated that by using a reflective model as a guide I have been able to break down, make sense of, and learnt from my experience during my placements In spite of above, the processes of learning I went through are more complex than Gibbs suggests. It is not as cyclical as this model implies and I found myself jumping or combining some stages, before coming back. However, it has taken me out of my comfort zone, challenging my thinking.

Mercedes-Benz Case Study Essay

Introduction Mercedes-Benz is a multinational division of the manufacturer Daimler AG from German and the brand is used for luxury automobiles, buses, coaches, and trucks. Mercedes-Benz’s headquarter is in Stuttgart, Baden-Wà ¼rttemberg, Germany. The brand first appeared in 1926 under Daimler Benz which originally from Daimler’s 1901 Mercedes and from Karl Benz’s 1886 Benz Patent Motorwagen, widely remarked as the first automobile. The following report is to engage the readers how a Mercedes-Benz automobile is being produced and the process strategy that the company had developed in order to become top selling car in the world. It also reveals the critical dimensions of the product quality for the Mercedes-Benz automobile products. Product Design and Development Process The process of making a Mercedes-Benz vehicle usually takes around three years from the initial drawing to final approval of the model. During these three years, the new Mercedes-Benz passes through development stages in which the designer team works together to produce the final vehicle. The team converts the initial drawings (modular design) into the next generation of Mercedes-Benz vehicle. The following process is the steps to produce a finished automobile: 1. Drawing/Rendering: the designer team initially draws a hand-sketched on a piece of paper, or on a screen. 2. Digital/Package: a virtual image of the automobile is created on a computer (CAD system). Source: www.carbodydesign.com Source: www.carbodydesign.com 3. 1:4 clay models: the next step is to create a clay model of every variant of a new automobile. The designers will then decide whether their drafts create the desired effect in three dimensions, too. At the same time virtual models are created on the computer. 4. Model selection: With the help of scanning and milling machines the first full-size model are made. The final form of the new automobile is chosen in order to be formally examined in a 1:1 scale. Source: www.carbodydesign.com Source: www.carbodydesign.com 5. 1:1 model: all the individual details of the new model are handmade. In this step, a real-looking model is created and it reveals all the characteristic features of the new automobile. 6. Interior sketches: in this step, the designers sketch for the design of the interior. This is where the driver seat designs are created. Source: www.carbodydesign.com Source: www.carbodydesign.com 7. Interior clay model: all the details are created until a desired top-quality feeling is created. Three alternative choices of interiors are built for a decision to be made. 8. Colour & trim / operating and display concept (control and display system): the material and colour for the automobile interior are chosen from hundreds of fabric and leather samples as well as a virtually endless colour spectrum. All the control and display elements are designed and developed too. 9. Interior data control model: all the materials and colours are tested and checked for effect on producing 1:1 interior models under â€Å"real-life conditions†. Every material and every colour is allocated a code and specified. 10. Final model: the exterior and the interior with all their details are combined together to create a model and the future Mercedes-Benz model becomes tangible. 11. Model approval: finally, the design process has to obtain approval by the Board of Management. If this is successful, the production of the new Mercedes-Benz is released. Manufacturing Process and Process Strategy Mercedes-Benz automobiles are mainly manufactured in Sindelfingen, Germany assembly plant. This is where all the important functions like sales record, design and development; pre-production and production-planning worldwide have been integrated at one site. In early 1994, the foundations for the plant and the production system for Mercedes-Benz US International Inc. (MBUSI) were set up and it was not far away from Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The site mainly manufactured the Mercedes-Benz M-Class, GL-Class and R-Class SUVs. In 2011 the plant produced more than 148,000 vehicles and employed approximately 2,800 people by year’s end. This report is focusing on the production of Mercedes-Benz automobiles factory in the Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Source: www.automotivetraveler.com Source: www.automotivetraveler.com The production facility in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, it involves six production cornerstones of the vehicle’s assembly process. The employees are encouraged to work toward developing improvements and emphasized on the cleanliness and safety. First of all, the factory has a large office area where all the materials and parts that are ordered from suppliers which are mainly come from North American suppliers and others. The production teams will then set a production date and create a barcode including the VIN and other specifications. Mercedes-Benz does not stock up a lot of parts. In fact, they adopt â€Å"just-in-time† method and maintain only two to three hours of inventory on the line. Moreover, Mercedes-Benz does not stamp out its own metal body parts. Source: www.automotivetraveler.com Source: www.automotivetraveler.com The body shop has hundreds of German-made (KUKA) welding machines that assembly materials and parts together. The plant itself has approximately 800 machines and 600 of them are in the body shop. To ensure safety in this area, a flexible screen is used to cover the flying sparks. The employees inspect critical welds to identify dimensional accuracy and after the welding is complete, another inspection is conducted to ensure the exterior body is ready for paint. After the body shop production, the second-floor paint shop at the Tuscaloosa plant is a super clean environment where a proper suit and headgear are required to prevent unwanted dirt or particles. In this area, the vehicles go through the six steps process such as, a pre-cleaning, a phosphate dip, and the application of an electrically charged e-coat, primer, colour coat, and finally the top coat. Every vehicle goes through for more than three miles on conveyor belts as it travels through the painting process and curing ovens. After inspections, the vehicles return back to the assembly shop for the installation of the interior parts and engine. This section of plant includes: 1. six â€Å"trim lines† 2. four â€Å"final lines† 3. â€Å"door line† 4. â€Å"engine/chassis line† 5. â€Å"off-line quality test† 6. Source: www.automotivetraveler.com Source: www.automotivetraveler.com repair area The employees and the machines are working together side by side, applying their advanced and various skills to the vehicles as they move slowly along the assembly lines. If any deviation is detected, one of the employees will pull a rope that creates a short melodic tune. Each line has its own melody and every employee is able to recognize â€Å"their song†. Repair area usually takes a short period of time and quickly most vehicles continued one. In the engine/chassis assembly line, the major parts of the engine are united and numerous machines work together in this section. Usually all the engines come from either Berlin or Stuttgart. Source: www.automotivetraveler.com Source: www.automotivetraveler.com Then the vehicles will go through the off-line quality checks. This involves some rattles test such as, driving over rollers that imitate the bumpy road situations while an employee inspects for any rattling sounds. There is also another quality check station that inspects the vehicles to ensure proper sealing by using high-pressure hoses to replicate the pounding rainstorms and flooded roads. After all the vehicles have passes through the final inspections, the vehicles will be prepared to transport to the dealers or be shipped for the international orders. As we can see from the manufacturing process of the Mercedes-Benz automobiles, the company adopts the process strategy of repetitive focus. They have standardized modules that assembly materials and parts together and the facilities are organized as assembly lines. Hence, the production of Mercedes-Benz automobiles are efficient and usually having medium volumes of outputs. The company adopts repetitive focus strategy as it also has machines that help in the assembly lines of the production as well as skilled and trained employees that work in the factory. Five Critical Dimensions of Product Quality Taking example of Mercedes-Benz GL-Class SUV, there are some critical dimensions of its product quality. In this report, each dimension delivers two examples of its product quality. * Performance Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com The Mercedes-Benz GL-Class SUV is equipped with the special engine called â€Å"handcrafted AMG 5.5L biturbo V-8.† It is a high-tech powerhouse with a thunderous 550hp at 5,250-5750 rpm and 560 lb-ft of torque at 2,000-5,000 rpm. This engine improves the efficiency and emissions. Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com The vehicle is also equipped with another engine which is called â€Å"7-speed AMG SPEEDSHIFT transmission.† It features three driving modes that can be selected via a console-mounted button called â€Å"Controlled Efficiency†, it functions as a fuel-saving ECO Start/Stop function. * Features Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com One of the features that GL-Class SUV has is the â€Å"PARKTRONIC with Active Parking Assist.† This feature helps the driver to size up parallel-parking spaces as most drivers have difficulty in parallel-parking. Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com Another feature will be the â€Å"ATTENTION ASSIST driver-drowsiness monitor.† This system will monitor the different parameters of driving behaviour and automatically alert the driver with both visual and warnings if the system detects any signs of drowsiness. * Conformance In the U.S. and Europe, large of quantity of vehicles have use no gasoline and produce zero tailpipe emissions are already in use. Mercedes-Benz vehicles are also adopting the zero-emission driving concept. For generations, Mercedes-Benz has been ground-breaking fuel-cell car to help preserve the earth for future generations. Hence, Mercedes-Benz is collaborating with Clean Diesel, a leading non-profit to help sustaining the environment. Therefore, Mercedes-Benz produces a BlueTEC Clean Diesel, a small engine yet delivers powerful mpg and low emissions. It is also known as the world’s cleanest and most advanced diesel. * Aesthetics Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com The design of the vehicle is one of the aspects to consider when customers choose and purchase the vehicle. Hence, the â€Å"Refined cabin styling† of the GL-Class is delivering a first-class design of the driver seat and seating rows. Source: www.mbusa.com Source: www.mbusa.com Another unique design that GL-Class has is the â€Å"21-inch AMG twin 5-spoke wheels†. It features the five twin spokes and a brilliant silver touch. The feature itself has the confident on the wet-road performance and a composed ride quality. * Serviceability Source: www.mercedes-benz.com.sg Source: www.mercedes-benz.com.sg There is a Mercedes-Benz centre in Singapore where the vehicles will enjoy five-star treatment. The centre provides new servicing and repair facilities as well as the Diagnostic Assistance System which is linked directly to Germany for up-to-the-second technical data. It also can quickly assess any vehicle. With trained and skilled technicians, customers could enjoy professional service from the Mercedes-Benz service centre whereby it is located at 301 Alexandra Road Singapore 159968. References: Mercedes-Benz: design philosophy. (2012). Retrieved January 14, 2013 from http://www.carbodydesign.com/2012/05/mercedes-benz-design-philosophy/ 125 years of visionary design: Automobile Design – Made by Mercedes-Benz. (2010). Retrieved January 14, 2013 from http://media.daimler.com/dcmedia/0-921-1262677-1-1347994-1-0-0-0-0-0-11701-854934-0-1-0-0-0-0-0.html Dorofte, A. L. (2012). The new Mercedes-Benz GL-Class: Development and production – Digital worlds in real vehicles. Retrieved January 14, 2013 from http://mercedes-benz-blog.blogspot.sg/2012/08/the-new-mercedes-benz-gl-class_ 28.html Lander, B. (2010). Touring the Mercedes-Benz Factory in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://www.automotivetraveler.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=994:touring-the-mercedes-benz-factory-in-tuscaloosa-alabama&catid=122:bimmer-dreamer&Itemid=315 Mercedes-Benz & The Environment. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes/benz/green GL63 AMG SUV features. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes/vehicles/model/class-GL/model-GL63#design Mercedes-Benz Centre – Level 1, Service Center & Vehicle Delivery. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://www.mercedes-benz.com.sg/content/singapore/mpc/mpc_singapore_website/enng/home_mpc/passengercars/home/world/mercedes-benz_center/level_1.0002.html

History of international systems Essay

On 5 October 1954 representatives of the United States, Britain, Italy, and Yugoslavia signed Trieste settlement in London. According to its terms military government was to stop in the two zones of the FTT, and Italy and Yugoslavia would presume governing authority on their respective sides of the new frontier. The agreement was approved promptly by the governments concerned and came into effect a few weeks later. Captivatingly, the Soviet Union accepted the Trieste settlement without dissent. The American embassy in Moscow accredited this reaction to the Kremlin’s â€Å"wish not to take sides in [the] matter or endanger its current efforts to regularize relations with Yugosalvia.† The issue also no longer held worth as a source of anti-Western propaganda once an Italo-Yugoslav agreement had been protected. As there were no other potential objectors of any implication, realization of the agreement proceeded smoothly. Though the departure of the Anglo-American garrison on 26 October 1954 ended almost a decade of direct United States contribution in Trieste. For various reasons, including bad weather and rumors of a plot to eliminate General Winterton, the formal ceremony to hand over authority from AMG to the Italians did not take place as planned. Winterton did, however, issue a public declaration on the morning of 26 October declaring that â€Å"the Allied Military government of the British and United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste is hereby finished.† In the afternoon thousands of Triestines crowded into Piazza Unità   in pouring rain and a howling bora (the notorious Triestine gale) to see the Italian tricolor once again rose over their city. As far as American policymakers were concerned, the Trieste disagreement had been decisively resolved. In terms of international law the settlement was in fact â€Å"provisional† in that a permanent, formal taking apart the FTT would have forced revision of the Italian peace treaty — an act needing the consent of all the signatory nations to that document. As a real solution, however, the London agreement was final as both the Italian and Yugoslav governments renowned it as a practical — if not ideal — cooperate and they wanted it to endure. The two Western powers helped make certain the effective decisiveness of the memorandum of understanding by making obvious they would support neither Italian nor Yugoslav claims to the territory now in the other’s sovereignty (Conrad Allison Alan. 1956). In the wake of a brief diplomatic erupt of the dispute in 1974, Italy and Yugoslavia ultimately decided to celebrate the provisional solution by concluding the alleged Osimo accords of 10 November 1975. These agreements meant that Italy given up its claims to Zone B while Yugoslavia officially recognized that Trieste was Italian territory. There were also prerequisites for protection of national minorities and for local economic collaboration between Italy and Yugoslavia. The two governments accordingly advised the United Nations Security Council, the United States and Great Britain that â€Å"the 1954 London Memorandum which recognized the situation prior to the present agreement is now void.† After more than two decades the â€Å"provisional† de facto settlement which had been so cautiously engineered in 1954 had lastly given rise to a permanent de jure elucidation of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary dispute. It is extremely unlikely that the Trieste question will be reopened in the predictable future. Though, throughout its history Trieste has shared the fortunes of a larger area known as the Julian Region, which has been of long-standing meaning in European political geography. For two thousand years this area at the head of the Adriatic was a strategic thoroughfare or frontier zone where the clash of competitor expansionist forces caused numerous changes in sovereignty. Since the nineteenth century it has also been the setting for a conflict between opposing national and political ideologies which would close in the struggle for Trieste and close by territories after World War II. One significance of these rivalries and shifting sovereignties has been that the area in question — now alienated between Italy and Yugoslavia — is difficult to define. Italians came to call this region Venezia Giulia (Julian Venetia), while Croats and Slovenes adopted the term Julijska Krajina (the Julian March) to portray an almost equivalent territory. In English, the area became known as the Julian Region. Physically, the Julian Region comprises a natural doorway between the Italian plain of the Po Valley and the Danubian Basin, in large part as of the excellent mountain passes found at the meeting point of the Julian Alps and the Dinaric Range. Its shores mark the point where the Adriatic reaches on the way to the landlocked states of Central Europe, and the Gulfs of Trieste and Fiume (Rijeka) on the two sides of the Istrian peninsula represent the most suitable northern outlets to that sea. In effect, the area is a natural crossroads between the Italian peninsula, the Balkans, and Central Europe. The strategic and economic allegations of this geographical setting prompted frequent conflict amongst nearby states for its control. The character of the Julian Region as a â€Å"zone of strain† was further resistant by the fact that it was one of the few points of direct contact between all three of Europe’s major ethnic groupings: Latins, Slavs, and Germans. It is barely surprising that all through history this area has been directly affected by the broader power struggles in the lands around it. The strategic and economic implication of the Julian Region was obvious as early as Roman times. After conquering the Illyro-Celtic peoples who initially inhabited this area, the Romans used the Julian Region as a major military and commercial thoroughfare. While the Roman Empire falls apart the area became a chronic battlefield and an open corridor into Italy for successive waves of invaders: Byzantines in 394; Goths in 400; Huns in 454; Ostrogoths in 488; and Lombards and Avars in 568 (Heim Keith Merle, 1973). By 811 the whole Julian Region had been integrated into the Carolingian Empire but was soon broken up into diverse feudal holdings whose rulers continuously intrigued against each other. After the tenth century the region became the focal point of a broader rivalry between the determined Venetian Republic and the rising Habsburg Empire. The two powers clashed continually in the area until the eighteenth century, when the Habsburgs finally dislodged the Venetians from their last footholds on the western Istrian coast. Excepting a brief break under French rule throughout the Napoleonic era, the Julian Region remained under Habsburg control until the First World War. In case of Yugoslavia, A secret British initiative in early 1941 provoked the first broader international contemplation of postwar revision of the Italo-Yagoslav boundary. At a time when Britain’s wartime situation was at its lowest ebb, Prime Minister Winston Churchill became persuaded that Hitler was preparing an advance into the Balkans. The British began considering diverse expedients to harden local resistance to German penetration, hoping particularly to persuade the Yugoslavs and Turks to enter the war. In the case of Yugoslavia, one measure was to promise postwar territorial compensations in the Julian Region. In January 1941 the Yugoslav minister in Moscow, Milan Gavrilović, suggested that â€Å"it might assist the Yugoslav government to strengthen their own position, and through them that of their neighbors against the Germans,† if Britain were to hold up Yugoslav claims in the Julian Region. Officials in the British Foreign Office noted that the proposal spanked of â€Å"bribery† and was reminiscent of the 1915 Pact of London but, in order â€Å"to be armed at all points,† they requested Arnold Toynbee’s Foreign Research and Press Service to study the Yugoslav case for frontier rectifications. A report was appropriately produced in early February concluding that Yugoslavia had sound claims on racial grounds to most of Istria and the Italian islands off Dalmatia, but not to the cities of Trieste, Gorizia (Gorica), Rijeka, and Zadar (Zara). The Foreign Office only desired cabinet approval â€Å"to hold out this bait to the Yugoslavs.† But the British war cabinet showed little interest while the subject was raised, and there the matter might have rested. Only days later the Yugoslav stance became more vital when the war cabinet decided on 24 February to send British forces to Greece. The Foreign Office now recommended that, in spite of the British policy of not discussing territorial changes during the war, â€Å"the verdict of the Yugoslav Government at the present juncture is of such importance that it would be valuable to disregard this rule on this occasion if by doing so we could persuade Yugoslavia to mediate forcibly on behalf of Greece† (Lees Lorraine Mary, 1976).   The cabinet concurred. At the time Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was meeting with the Yugoslav government. The cabinet informed him that if he thought it â€Å"necessary or useful† he could indicate that â€Å"his Majesty’s Government are studying with consideration the case for revisions of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier which they are disposed to think could be recognized and advocated by them at the Peace Conference.† Notwithstanding the importance placed on Yugoslav support, the cabinet specified that British policy on the matter must not move beyond this vague formula, which did not entrust Britain to a precise frontier line. British representatives in fact mentioned the territorial issue to the Yugoslavs, but the entire question became irrelevant in April while Italy and Germany invaded Yugoslavia (Kay Robin., 1967). Though inconclusive, the British initiative initiated the pattern according to which Allied policy on the Italo-Yugoslav boundary issue would open out throughout the war. The British had intentionally limited themselves to a vague proposal for approving consideration of Yugoslav claims in the Julian Region and were cautious not to suggest a specific location for an ethnic state line. While eager to tack somewhat, they did not believe the issue justified a major deviation from the policy of not committing themselves on postwar boundaries. In 1941 British interest in Italo-Yugoslav frontier rectifications was based on immediate military expediency. It was of a piece with historian Elisabeth Barker’s general account of British wartime policies in southeastern Europe as â€Å"a story of last-minute inventiveness and the undertaking of commitments without the resources to fulfill them. Policies, if that is the right word for them, were mainly dictated by negative outside factors.† (Black Gregory Dale, 1973) Insofar as Allied policies impinged on the Italo-Yugoslav fight for the Julian Region during World War II, their influence would usually remain indirect, a reverberation of broader military and political ideas of the different Allied nations. This early British incursion into the boundary dispute also prefigured later Anglo-American disagreements on military and political goals in southeastern Europe. Rumors of â€Å"secret agreements† on the Julian Region prompted concern amongst American policymakers, who were supporting an even more accurate policy of no political or territorial settlements throughout the war — partly because of experiences during World War I with secret accords such as the Pact of London. In July 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt queried Churchill about â€Å"the stupid story that you promised Trieste to Yugoslavia.† Recalling that in 1919 there were severe problems â€Å"over actual and alleged promises to the Italians and others,† Roosevelt asked Churchill to think stating publicly â€Å"that no post-war peace commitments as to territories, populations or economies have been given.† (Modisett Lawrence, 1981). At the Atlantic Charter discussions in August, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British permanent in secretary of state for foreign affairs, assured Sumner Welles, the American under secretary of state, that Britain had made no such obligations, with the possible exception of an oral declaration to the Yugoslav government that at war’s end â€Å"the subject of jurisdiction over Istria was a matter which might well come up for reassessment!† Cadogan added that this statement noticeably did not constitute â€Å"a firm commitment† and that Trieste or Gorizia had not been mentioned. â€Å"Heartened† by this assurance, Welles underlined that the United States wished to evade repeating the problems caused in World War I while secret accords concerning Great Britain were disclosed. The British did not officially disavow secret treaties but Washington’s distress about their territorial agreements, which had been sparked by the â€Å"secret agreements† with Yugoslavia, was somewhat allayed by the signature on 14 August 1941 of the Atlantic Charter. The first two points of that document affirmed that neither Great Britain nor the United States sought â€Å"aggrandizement, territorial or other† and that both countries wished â€Å"to see no territorial changes that do not pact with the generously expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.† (Samuel Rosenman, 314). Despite this assertion of Anglo-American unity, the chance appearance of the Julian issue had already evinced differences in the two nations’ fidelity to a method of no wartime agreements on politico territorial questions. British interests in southeastern Europe would guide to further wartime disagreements with the United States on such matters. The withdrawal of American troops from Trieste in October 1954 marked the conclusion of nearly a decade of American participation together with Great Britain in the â€Å"temporary† management of the disputed city. Throughout that period the United States became the foremost partner in the occupation and provided the lion’s share of the funds needed to maintain AMG operations. Thousands of American soldiers spent some time in Trieste between 1945 and 1954, and a few even gave their lives whilst serving there. The United States, moreover, was the key actor in posing a lasting resolution of the dispute. United States was drawn into the Trieste disagreement as a by-product of the more general process throughout which wartime intervention in Europe led to American entanglement in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. After 1945 American policymakers at all levels came to view the Trieste question in terms of broader Cold War objectives — especially with revere to Italy and Yugoslavia. In one sense American policy on this issue was conquered by fundamentally negative goals: preventing Yugoslav control of the city and thereby restraining communism on the southeastern border of Western Europe. Yet the American presence in Trieste also symbolized the positive declaration of the principle of self-determination in accord with a fundamental liberal internationalist ideology which predated the initiation of the Cold War. The story of the American experience in Trieste can be viewed on the whole as the conjuncture of two historical developments. The first of these was the persistence into the twentieth century of the Julian Region’s momentous function as a barometer of broader pressures in European international politics. After 1945 Trieste was not just a localized focal point of national and ideological conflict but also became a deliberately important point on the edge of an increasingly sharp dividing line between two opposing systems of global order. If Trieste had not been a piece of disputed ground on that demarcation line between East and West, there would have been little motive for a major American presence there (Rabel Roberto. 1984). The other applicable historical development was, certainly, the rise of the United States to global power and its enthusiasm to exercise that power to encourage a liberal, internationalist world order. Under Woodrow Wilson’s leadership the United States first sought to use its power to this end in Europe throughout and after World War I, but with little success. As the United States became entangled in a second European war in the 1940s, it acted much more vigorously to achieve its wartime and postwar objectives, even though several of the latter were indistinctly defined. On both occasions American policymaking was a direct result of more general American aims in Europe. Throughout World War II, however, there was an absolute gulf between Washington’s general postwar aims as proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and its efforts at developing a feasible policy mechanism to accomplish them in the Julian Region. American wartime policy toward the Julian dilemma was positively based on the hope of solving it according to Atlantic Charter principles, but policymakers in Washington failed to define the United States’ interests in the area and did not expect any significant postwar commitment there. Certainly, although American statesmen were concerned to avoid an armed clash with any of their allies, they made no pragmatic attempt to put up Yugoslav objections to Anglo-American plans for the occupation of the Julian Region. Until the crisis of May 1945 there was, quite purely, no coherent strategy for implementing American objectives in the Julian Region. When World War II ended Trieste was not yet a Cold War issue. It was throughout the crisis of May 1945 that an origin of Trieste as such first really began to take hold amongst leading policymakers in Washington. Winston Churchill and Alexander Kirk had long been urging that Anglo-American policy on the Julian Region be viewed as part of a broader anticommunist strategy, but their exhortations had not been observed by Roosevelt or the State Department. Certainly, the State Department had idealistically continued to assert its commitment to the policy of installing AMG throughout the Julian Region, as remaining cautious in practice and taking no practical steps to execute it. In the face of Yugoslav occupation of Trieste, the United States finally had to face the fact that its existing policy was vague and idealistic. Unable to rely on platitudes or to put off the issue for reasons of â€Å"military necessity,† policymakers in Washington chose to combat the Yugoslav occupation of Trieste in the name of liberal principles. State Department officials, of whom Joseph Grew was the most influential, now began to see the issue in terms of broader collective aggression. The new American president, Harry S Truman, appeared to coincide in their conclusion. However, the Americans did not wish to be too aggressive and were pleased to resolve the crisis with a working concession: the Yugoslavs withdrew from Trieste, while the United States and Britain inaudibly put aside their official policy of imposing AMG on the whole Julian Region. That outcome represented an accomplishment for the tacit spheres-of-influence approach to East-West relations which the Truman administration would take on in the immediate postwar period. In itself, Trieste was not an inner issue in the Cold War, and after the May crisis it had very little impact on the describing of the Cold War in general. It only came to prominence on occasions such as the discussions on the Italian peace treaty or the 1948 Italian elections, as the United States resurrected the issue for the opportunistic motivation of assuring a victory for the Christian Democrats. though not very important in itself, the Trieste case is of interest as an instance of the way in which Cold War politics unfolded in an area where the United States and the Soviet Union were not openly in confrontation. The deadlock between the powers that barred the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste was a striking case of the way in which all kinds of issues were reduced to simplistic terms of direct East-West confrontation in the postwar world. For a time the predicament of Trieste became a small pawn in the great game of Cold War politics and, particularly, was locked into the more general American strategy of containment. Dispensable in the long run, pawns can nonetheless serve significant short-term functions. From the American perspective, Anglo-American control of Trieste was useful for numerous reasons: it prevented â€Å"communism† expanding into another part of Europe; it helped retain Italy as a stable member of the Western coalition; it justified an Anglo-American military presence in a potentially significant strategic point; it enabled the United States to appear as the champion of liberal principles; and, on the local level, it provided Trieste with an effectual and comparatively impartial administration. Whether laudable or self-serving, none of these American objectives was overtly related to the task of achieving a lasting, long-standing solution of the Trieste problem that Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Triestines could all believe. Ideally, the United States would have liked the return of the entire Free Territory of Trieste to Italy, but did not think that goal to merit the risk of an armed clash with the Yugoslavs. Short of that outcome, Washington usually viewed Trieste as a controllable issue and seemed ready to maintain a military presence there indefinitely. In Cold War terms there was little reason for importance in attempting to reach an eternal resolution of the dispute. After the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948, though, the advantages of retaining the status quo in Trieste gradually reduced. The United States now had a concern in keeping Tito out of the Soviet fold as well as sustaining the Italian government. In the past Italy’s Christian Democrats had productively played on American fears of Italian domestic instability to ensure a moderately pro-Italian line on Trieste, because Washington viewed Italy as a Cold War ally while Yugoslavia seemed a stalwart member of the Soviet bloc. Once Yugoslavia’s international status became more indefinite, Belgrade was in a position to play a similar game. The United States found itself in a perturbed situation where, because of past commitments, it lacked the autonomy to maneuver it would have liked on the Trieste issue. It is hard to assess the success of United States policy in Trieste from World War II to 1954 as that policy was often unclear in its explicit objectives. Yet there can be little doubt that American intervention â€Å"saved† Trieste for Italy — and, therefore, for the West (Kardelj Edvard. 1953). The American existence served as a stabilizing force in the area and assisted demonstrates the strength of the American commitment to Western Europe (and to the containment of communism on its borders). On the local level it helped make certain relatively impartial and efficient direction of the area until a permanent settlement could be agreed upon. Though the American stay in Trieste was needlessly prolonged, by 1954 the United States had determined the problem enduringly and at a minor cost. In Cold War terms American policy in Trieste might be termed a restrained success. That success did not essentially attest to the perspicacity of American Cold War policy in general but was in large measure due to circumstances unusual to the Trieste case. The United States would certainly not be generally as successful in the Cold War. Negotiations had been followed intimately in Washington from the moment Trieste was liberated. Certainly, the week or so during which Alexander sought a contract with Tito was a critical period in the development of American policy toward the problem. Throughout this time some American policymakers came to view the Trieste situation as an instance of totalitarian hostility and demanded firm opposition to it. The course of American policy after 10 May is particularly noteworthy in view of the mood in Washington throughout the final days of the military â€Å"race† for Trieste. Despite Kirk’s stress on the political necessity of establishing AMG in as much of the Julian Region as probable, Stimson’s caution had originally prevailed. Officials in Washington had seemed to recognize that perhaps only Alexander’s operational requirements could be met. Grew had even notified Kirk on 1 May that, if the Yugoslavs opposed the expansion of AMG, â€Å"we cannot consider the use of American troops to enforce this policy† (Harris, 1957). This apparent refutation of the State Department’s own policy stemmed largely from the fear of unsafe clashes with the Yugoslavs if they controlled the majority of the Julian Region. Trieste’s liberation on 2 May had complicated the state of affairs insofar as an armed clash was now possible even in satisfying Alexander’s minimum operational requirements. Officials in Washington continued to retort cautiously, recognizing that direct contact between the two armies at Trieste could be more volatile than the contingencies hitherto foreseen. The War Department advised stoutly against risking an armed clash, and Stimson repeated to grow his usual line that â€Å"the American people would not continue our getting entangled in the Balkan s.† Stimson believed that the problem was â€Å"another case of these younger men, the subordinates in the State Department, doing dangerous things.†(Coles Harry L., and Albert K, 1964) Grew was unrevealing, but the State Department risked no major initiatives as Alexander negotiated with Tito. Even with a crisis intimidating and Anglo-American control of Trieste itself uncertain, the State Department did not eagerly abandon its unrealistic AMG policy. While Alexander tried to safe a working compromise, Kirk continually warned his superiors in Washington of radical consequences in Italy if the original AMG strategy were set aside. The Italian government also dissents to the Americans, urging total AMG control of the Julian Region as promised. State Department officials were not adamant to these arguments. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, told Grew on 2 May that â€Å"when it becomes overtly known that Tito’s forces are assuming control in that area we might expect serious outbursts both in Italy and on the part of our large and significant Italian-American population here.† Grew himself expressed similar views to the president, suggestive of those American troops might have to be used to keep order in northern Italy if Yugoslav occupation of the Julian Region endured. Some State Department officials would have favored to maintain the original AMG policy but their hands were tied by Stimson’s and Truman’s antagonism as well as by Alexander’s insistence on securing only necessary military requirements. The president’s reluctance to use armed force at last brought them face to face with the basic discrepancy of having a forcefully articulated policy but no pragmatic means of implementing it. There is evidence, additionally, that the State Department was not content simply to await the outcome of the Tito-Alexander negotiations. The department wished to confer with the Soviet Union in the hope that Moscow might influence the Yugoslavs to withdraw from the Julian Region. Such a hope was predicated on the supposition already evident among American policymakers — that Stalin could manage Tito. It was of a piece with Washington’s faith in the effectiveness of summit-level negotiations amongst the great powers as a means of neutralizing local conflicts, assuring inter-Allied harmony and, presumably, securing the achievement of Atlantic Charter principles. Both Matthews and Ambassador Patterson in Belgrade suggested sounding out the Soviets even though Moscow had not yet replied to the earlier notification of American intentions in the Julian Region. When Alexander’s negotiations with Belgrade broke down on 9 May, the basic basics of the State Department’s postwar policy on Trieste were in place (Clissold Stephen, 1975). They were in large measure a rational extension of wartime goals but they also accepted intimations of an emerging Cold War atmosphere. Trieste policy would be directed by three major concerns, to be given conflicting emphases at appropriate times. Trieste itself remained in limbo as negotiations were proceeding. It was not surprising that the abrupt aftermath of war would be accompanied by displacement and tension in a city which had been the center of intensely challenging ethnic, ideological and strategic interests. In this particular case those problems were aggravated by the fact that the Yugoslav and Anglo-American contingents, both of which were resistant after 2 May, were systematically intermingled and lacked clear explanation of their respective lines of authority and accountability. Trieste’s value as a pawn in the Cold War had been approximately eliminated. It gradually became obvious to American policymakers that the Trieste question was now merely a needless source of tension between an appreciated ally and a would-be opponent of the Soviet Union. Although it remained convenient, the prospective existed for an awkward crisis and the United States became increasingly keen to reach a compromise resolution. The pressures to be purge of this occasionally exasperating problem were heightened by the local unrest and the Italo-Yugoslav tensions of 1952. By then the expedition for a Trieste settlement had become an ever more annoying challenge to Washington’s skills in alliance management. as a result, even if Clare Boothe Luce had not taken a strong personal interest in the matter, the Eisenhower supervision would still have acted much as it did to make certain that a lasting settlement was reached in 1954 by initiating four-power negotiations and by using political and economic control on Italy and Yugoslavia to bring about a final conformity. It is notable that the United States ended its presence in Trieste simply after the area had lost all effectiveness as a Cold War pawn. The United States began to work in intense for a conclusive settlement of the Trieste question after 1949. Shifting American objectives in Italy and Yugoslavia had eliminated Trieste’s worth as an instrument of Cold War policy for the United States. By the early 1950s Italy had become decisively integrated into the Western camp and was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as Yugoslavia remained outside the Soviet bloc. The unresolved problem of the FTT’S future was thus an unnecessary source of tension between two countries the United States believed important. Trieste was clearly no longer a Cold War problem in the sense that it had been before the Soviet-Yugoslav break. American policymakers justifiably accomplished that it was pointless to retain indefinitely a military and economic binder which now held few strategic or political advantages for their country. The United States had played a key role in the â€Å"provisional† declaration of the Trieste dispute, which had proved so annoying for so many years. Speaking in New York after the signing of the London memo of understanding, Dulles recalled that â€Å"when I became secretary of state, I made a list of the more significant problems which needed to be resolved in the interests of world peace and security. Trieste was in the top bracket of that list.† Of course, the â€Å"top bracket† also integrated more pressing and weighty problems such as Korea, Berlin, Germany, and the EDC. Alongside these issues the situation in Trieste did not seem to demand instantaneous attention and appeared â€Å"manageable† (Bass Robert, and Elizabeth Marbury, 1959). The Eisenhower administration did not actually take meaningful action on its intention to resolve the Trieste problem until provoked to do so by the threat of local violence and Luce’s potent and melodramatic reports from Italy. Thereafter, however, the American government acted more dynamically. After several false starts the United States thriving in initiating the three-phase negotiating process to evade the domestic pressures which had prevented Italy and Yugoslavia from reaching a solution. It was the United States, moreover, which ensured the success of these talks by taking advantage of its political influence in both countries, supplement by the economic force that had become a characteristic instrument of its Cold War policies in Western Europe. American policymakers did not trail a Trieste settlement simply for its own sake. It is true that after 1949 Trieste itself was no longer a central point of direct confrontation between the Western and Soviet blocs. Certainly, it was this development which made a solution potential by removing the perceived need for an enduring Anglo-American presence in the area. The Trieste issue had thus become a specific predicament in Washington’s relations with Italy and Yugoslavia. However, as had been the case since 1945, the interests of the United States in Trieste on the broadest level were still expressed in terms of the Cold War. The only change was that the larger purposes of the United States in the Cold War were now given out by terminating its commitment in Trieste. Eisenhower’s own reaction to the decree of the Trieste dispute exemplified this more general concern: â€Å"Now the way was open for Italian participation in the Western European Union and for success in negotiations for defense bases. The Communist threat to Italy had been avoided, and that nation now trod on firmer ground. And the risk of an explosion had passed.† Dulles was even more liberal in describing the implications of the Trieste settlement in October 1954: â€Å"A grave cause of dissension and unrest has been removed, so that all of South Europe can breathe more easily. Primarily, a demonstration had been given of the capability of the nations which are free of Soviet domination to resolve differences which abate them and divert them from the greatest issue of our time.† In short, the abolition of the Trieste problem was significant for the Eisenhower administration as it removed a needless distraction in Italo-Yugoslav relations, enabling both nations to stand more efficiently alongside the United States in its global confrontation with the Soviet Union. In that sense the important role of the United States in ending the dispute in 1954 marked the consummation of its policy of approaching the Trieste issue as a part of a broader Cold War strategy. Examined from today’s perspective, over fifty years after its declaration, the Trieste dispute seems at first glance to be of little implication in that broader struggle. For the United States it had been just one of the many skirmishes in the Cold War that did not involve direct American-Soviet military confrontation. Yet the Cold War has been an extensive series of such skirmishes, and Soviet and American armies have not met in face-to-face fighting in the postwar era. Basic strategies can have been conceived and approved in Washington and Moscow, but the key points at issue often concerned areas such as Trieste and concerned third parties. Viewed from that perspective, the story of American involvement in the Trieste dispute from World War II to 1954 is certainly that of the Cold War in microcosm. References: Bass Robert, and Elizabeth Marbury, eds. â€Å"The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record†. New York: Prospect Books, 1959. Black Gregory Dale. â€Å"The United States and Italy, 1943-1946: The Drift towards Containment†. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1973.   Clissold Stephen, ed. â€Å"Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: A Documentary Survey†. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975.   Coles Harry L. and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964. Conrad Allison Alan. â€Å"Allied Military Government of Venezia Giulia and Trieste — Its History and Organization†. M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1956. Harris C. R. S. Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943- 1945. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957. Heim Keith Merle. â€Å"Hope without Power: Truman and the Russians, 1945†. Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1973.   Kardelj Edvard. Trieste and Yugoslav-Italian Relations. New York: Yugoslav Information Center, 1953.   Kay Robin. â€Å"Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-1945: Italy†, Vol. 2, From Cassino to Trieste. Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1967. Lees Lorraine Mary. â€Å"American Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia, 1941-1949†. Ph.D. dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University, 1976. Modisett Lawrence E. â€Å"The Four-Cornered Triangle: British and American Policy towards Yugoslavia, 1939-1945†. 2 vols. Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1981. Rabel Roberto. â€Å"Between East and West: Trieste, the United States and the Cold War, 1943-1954†. Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1984. Samuel Rosenman, ed., Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol.10 (1938-1950), 314.

lsd Essay - 1485 Words

LSD (lysergic Acid Dyethilamide) A Swiss chemist named Dr. Albert Hoffman first produced lysergic acid Diethylmide –or best known as LSD in 1938 (Dye, 1992, p. 2). Hoffman discovered the drug while trying to synthesize a new drug for the treatment of headaches. He obtained the lysergic acid from the parasitic fungus that grows on rye plants known as ergot. From the lysergic acid, he synthesized the compound LSD. He used the compound to test for its pain killing properties on laboratory animals. Being that appeared totally ineffective, the bottle of LSD was placed on a shelf and remained untouched for five years. On April 16, 1943, Dr. Hoffman decided to do further research with the LSD compound (Dye, 1992 p. 5). While handling the drug,†¦show more content†¦One of the first areas of LSD experimentation was in treating alcoholism (Dye, 1992, p.36). After extensive research, it was concluded that LSD was not effective on treating alcoholism and the research was discontinued. LSD was also tested on schizophrenics, drug addicts and criminals (Dye, 1992 p. 38). Research determined that LSD was ineffective in treating any behavioral problems. It was also concluded that LSD might transform a normal individual into a person with a very calm to severe personality problem. The Central Intelligence Agency and various military agencies also became interested in LSD research in the late 1950’s (Dye, 1992, p.410.) Their interest in the drug was in the area of mind control. They saw the possibility of manipulating of manipulating the beliefs of strong willed people. They gave the drug to a group of army scientists and then attempted to change some of their basic beliefs while under the influence of the drug. However, one of the scientists became psychotic and committed suicide by jumping from a hotel window. These agencies continued their research by using drug addicts and prostitutes to test their mind control theories. 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Ecstasy is used at the party and rave scene for its effects on the emotional state of the user. The drug lowers the users inhibitions, increases awareness and feelings of pleasure and joy while giving the user energy (KusinitzRead More Club Drugs Essay986 Words   |  4 Pagesamateurs commonly create designer drugs in underground laboratories, the drugs can be dangerous (Mass 16). Among all designer drugs, MDMA, or Ecstasy is the most commonly used (Kusinitz 47). Others include Ketamine known commonly as Special K or â€Å"K†, and LSD also known as acid. Ecstasy is used at the party and rave scene for its effects on the emotional state of the user. The drug lowers the user’s inhibitions, increases awareness and feelings of pleasure and joy while giving the user energy (Kusinitz 152)Read MoreEssay on LSD1087 Words   |  5 PagesLSD For thousands of years people have spoke of all types of visions. Whether the visions were from religious groups, Indian tribes, or self proclaimed prophets; all types of people have seen things. This was more than likely occurring with the help of different types of hallucinogens. Hallucinogens have been around since the beginning of time. Some mushrooms, cactus flowers, and even different types of mold are all able to produce hallucinogenic effects. However, it was only within the lastRead MoreLSD an the Sixties Generation2479 Words   |  10 Pageswas called lysergic acid diethylamide, but is more commonly know as LSD. Albert Hofmann, as Swiss chemist, created this new drug in hopes that he might have found a profitable analeptic that could cure migraines. However, this was not the case. Hofmann decided to dose himself with the drug to see if it would help subdue headaches. He quickly discovered that this new drug did little for headaches, but did much for the head. LSD was beginning to be shipped off to America’s exploding market of psychiatristsRead MoreThe Mysterious LSD Essay2651 Words   |  11 Pagesthe hallucinogen LSD, has been a topic of controversy and mystery. The components of LSD are lysergic acid and diethylamide. As part of the ergoline family, LSD is often classified as a synthetic drug because it is produced only in a laboratory (Petechuk 10). Users of LSD are people from solid middle- and upper-class backgrounds. They have many opportunities to pursue higher education and to have successful careers (Petechuk 9). To most, this statistic would seem unusual, but LSD is notorious forRead MoreEssay On LSD856 Words   |  4 Pagesthat were under the influence of LSD in 2016. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a serotonergic hallucinogen that largely alters cognitive function when taken and is a similar molecule to psilocybin (the psychedelic used by Spitzer et al. in 1996). In the current study, it was predicted that t he effects of LSD would replicate that of psilocybin due to its similarity. Over the course of this study, ten participants received a placebo injection and an injection of LSD about a week apart from each otherRead More LSD Essay1234 Words   |  5 PagesHallucinogens In 1943, Albert Hofman took the first â€Å"acid trip,† from accidentally ingesting his creation known as LSD, or lysergic acid diethylamide. Hofman reported his experience of seeing amazing pictures, fantastic shapes, and effervescent colors. Since then, hallucinogenic drugs have widely spread across the drug market. Why are hallucinogenic drugs used so much across the United States, as well as the rest of the World? What is it about these drugs that alter people’s decisions and consciousnessRead More The Psychological Effects Of LSD Essay1677 Words   |  7 Pages The Psychological Effects of LSD Introduction nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;LSD has always been a center of controversy in American society, often times because peoplehave been miseducated about its effects or exposed to media bias. Its physiological effects onthe brain and body have become more and more apparent in the last few decades when research in neuroscience peaked. The psychological effects of LSD have been often difficult to describe and document very well -- they were first discovered